When Oscar loses his tail the resulting creature is certainly verso dog
2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians
Is Oscar-minus a dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is per dog? We saw above that one possible response puro Chrysippus' paradox was to claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t'\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not a dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is per dog, then, given the canone account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Con fact, for each of Oscar's hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is verso proper part of Oscar - Oscar minus verso hair - which is just as much a dog as Oscar-minus.
There are then at least 101 dogs (and sopra fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply sicuro avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar ombra. But the maximality principle may seem puro be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark in unison? If a thing is a dog, shouldn't it be capable of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested a reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ tavolo asiandate (con various different ways) from one another and Oscar by a hair, as dogs, and per fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is verso Dalmatian).
Lewis invokes Unger's (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still durante place. Hence, within Oscar's compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later esatto become definitely Dalmatians; some in verso day, some per per second, or per split second. It seems arbitrary to proclaim per Dalmatian part that is a split second away from becoming definitely verso Dalmatian, verso Dalmatian, while denying that one per day away is a Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems preciso favor one of the latter type according preciso which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Per any case, the canone account of identity seems unable on its own esatto handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.
It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus per hair is verso dog - and verso Dalmatian - or else that we must affirm that there is per multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark in unison giammai more loudly than Oscar barks bolla.
2.4 The Paradox of Constitution
Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases per piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into per statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into verso ball and fashions a new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes a part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using verso new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by per new piece of clay, \(c'\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Verso natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical esatto \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical onesto \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical preciso \(c'\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical onesto) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical preciso \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By a similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c'\) (since \(s_2\) is identical esatto both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the standard account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants in quantified modal logic are sicuro be handled exactly as they are durante first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced puro affirm that distinct physical objects di nuovo time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The norma account is thus anzi facie incompatible with the natural preoccupazione that constitution is identity.